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We investigate the impact of slavery on the current performances of the US economy. Over a cross 
section of counties, we find that the legacy of slavery does not affect current income per capita, but 
does affect current income inequality. In other words, those counties that displayed a higher 
proportion of slaves are currently not poorer, but more unequal. Moreover, we find that the impact 
of slavery on current income inequality is determined by racial inequality. We test three alternative 
channels of transmission between slavery and inequality: a land inequality theory, a racial 
discrimination theory and a human capital theory.  We find support for the third theory, i. e., even 
after controlling for potential endogeneity, current inequality is primarily influenced by slavery 
through the unequal educational attainment of blacks and whites. To improve our understanding of 
the dynamics of racial inequality along the educational dimension, we complete our investigation by 
analyzing a panel dataset covering the 1940-2000 period at the state level. Consistently with our 
previous findings, we find that the educational racial gap significantly depends on the initial gap, 
which was indeed larger in the former slave states. 
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1.      Introduction 
 
Recent developments in growth theory have debated the long-run influence of geography and 
institutions on comparative current economic performances. In this paper we address the same issue 
within the context of a single country - the United States - where a specific institution - slavery - has 
historically been associated more heavily with particular areas - primarily the South. To concentrate 
on a single country facilitates the empirical investigation on several grounds, since it reduces the 
risk of omitted variable bias that typically plagues across countries investigations. At the same time, 
because of their size and history, the US still presents sufficient variations along both the 
geographic and the institutional dimensions to make such investigation worthwhile. 
 
In the broader context of the Americas, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2005a) have influentially 
argued that factor endowments, in the form of soils, climate, and the size of the native population,  
have determined the diffusion of agricultural crops best suited for the employment of slave labor. 
The resulting unequal structure of society has in turn contributed to the evolution of a set of  legal, 
political, and educational institutions meant to preserve the privileges of the elites. Thus, even 
though factor endowments themselves can be viewed as exogenous, these initial conditions have 
exerted a magnified effect on current performances because the institutions subsequently developed 
tended to reinforce their influence. These institutions have then exerted a persistent impact on   
economic outcomes long after the abolition of slavery, determining paths of development 
characterized by marked inequality in wealth, human capital, and political power.  We test this 
theory for a cross section of  US counties, with special emphasis on the legacy of slavery for the 
current level of income and inequality.  
 
Slavery was introduced in North America as early as in the 16
th century and its diffusion escalated 
throughout the next centuries. Overall, the Middle Passage brought an estimated 645,000 slaves, 
mostly from Africa, to the territories that today represent the US. Initially most of the slaves were 
settled in the coastal Southern colonies, where they were employed primarily in agriculture. Later, 
between the American Revolution and the Civil War, with the Second Middle Passage  around a 
million slaves were relocated toward the inland regions  where the plantation economy was 
developing (Berlin, 2003). By the 1860 Census the US slave population had grown to four million, 
to represent about 13% of the entire population, distributed within 15 slave states. In the same year, 
almost 90% of the blacks living in the US were slaves. After the American Civil War led to the 
abolition of slavery in 1865, massive migration flows brought the former slaves from the rural 
South to the urban North. By 1940 75% of black men still lived in the South. By 2000, the fraction 3 
had further declined to about 55%. Therefore, the majority of the blacks are still located in the 
South, while for white men the corresponding fractions are much smaller at about 28% and 16%, 
respectively. In fact, the cross state correlation between the fraction of slaves in the population in 
1860 and the fraction of blacks in 2000 is 0.80. These figures indicate that, throughout American 
history and even after the end of the institution of slavery, the economic welfare of blacks has been 
tied closely to the performance of the Southern economy (Smith and Welch, 1989).   
 
The historiography of slavery in America is huge. Economic historians have focused on the 
profitability and the efficiency of slavery. In their provocative and controversial empirical work on 
the  antebellum South,  Fogel and Engerman (1974) suggested that slavery was both productive and 
economically efficient, a conclusion which was criticized, among others, by David et al. (1976). 
Lagerlöf (2009) and Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2010) model the economics of labor coercion from a 
related  perspective. A parallel research effort has been devoted to the long-term legacy of slavery, 
in a number of dimensions. While Nunn (2008a) has focused on the implications of slave trades in 
Africa, Engerman and Sokoloff (2005a) and Nunn (2008b) have examined the impact of slavery in 
the receiving countries. In particular, on the basis of historical evidence, the former formulate  the  
hypothesis that factor endowments, through large-plantation slavery and other inequality-
perpetuating institutions,  may have hampered  subsequent economic growth. The latter estimates 
the influence of slavery on the current performances of the US economy, to find that slave use is 
negatively correlated with subsequent economic development, but that  this relationship is not 
driven by large-scale plantation slavery, i.e., a more precise measure of factor endowments. He also 
finds a positive impact of slavery on 1860 land inequality, which  is in turn correlated with current 
income inequality, but no impact of 1860 land inequality on current income, which suggests that 
inequality may not be the channel of influence running from factor endowments to the current level 
of development. Mitchener and McLean (2003) find that the legacy of slavery has a strong and 
persistent effect on productivity levels across US states in the 1880-1980 period. Lagerlöf (2005) 
explores the link between geography and slavery and  also documents a negative relationship 
between slavery and current income. A common conclusion for this stream of the literature is a 
negative relationship between past slavery and current income per capita across US states and 
counties, even though the channels through with this influence materializes are still unclear.  
 
A separate research line has focused on the impact of race on inequality. This work has documented 
that, since emancipation and especially since 1940, the average income of black Americans has 
increased greatly, both in absolute and relative terms. The determinants of the relative improvement 
of  the economic status of blacks after WWII, however, have been the subject of debate. Both the 4 
civil rights movement, with its impact on the labor market through affirmative action laws, and 
long-term changes in human capital have been advanced as possible explanations of the observed 
trend (Heckman, 1990 and Margo, 1990). The main contributions to the line of research on race and 
human capital are Smith (1984), Smith and Welch (1989), followed by Margo (1990) and Collins 
and Margo (2006).
1 The evidence collected by these authors documents the evolution of racial 
differences both in the quality and the quantity of education, starting from the emancipation of 
blacks in the post-Civil War era and taking into account the potential legacy of slavery for human 
capital accumulation. Initially African-Americans had essentially no exposure to formal schooling, 
as a legacy of  the extremely high rates of illiteracy that existed under slavery. The first generations 
of former slaves were able to complete far fewer years of schooling, on average, than whites. 
Moreover, they had access to racially segregated public schools, mostly in the South, where they 
received a qualitatively inferior education, even if compared to that received by Southern whites.
2 
In an initial phase, the combination of low educational attainment and inferior educational quality 
determined the persistence of large wage and income gaps. Subsequently,  however, the racial 
schooling gap declined, as successive generations of black children received more and better 
schooling, with an eventual impact on earnings. Overall, despite the initial conditions and the 
persistence of discrimination, the reported evidence on the evolution of educational differences, in a 
wide number of dimensions (such as literacy rates, years of educational attainment, spending per 
pupil, and returns to literacy), overwhelmingly points to long-term convergence. A related stream of 
the literature on racial inequality in education has measured the long-term influence of  family 
background (as captured by ability, or parental education) on the schooling process (see for example 
Cameron and Heckman, 2001). Within this stream, Sacerdote (2005) has focused on a comparison 
between the grandchildren of former slaves and free blacks, to find substantial convergence of 
educational outcomes, since by 1920 the remaining legacy of slavery is such that all blacks are 
affected equally. While the contribution of human capital to the improvement of the economic status 
of blacks cannot be disputed, as previously mentioned other factors have also been evaluated. In 
particular, it has been argued that at the beginning of the 20th century employment segregation in 
agriculture, especially in  the South, was also instrumental in delaying income convergence, while 
after WWI an increased demand of black labor in the North may have accelerated it. Likewise, 
further pressure toward convergence occurred in the 1960s with the civil rights movement.    
  
Given these premises, to investigate the long-term impact of slavery on current economic 
performances, we start by revisiting the available evidence on the impact of slavery on current per 
                                                 
1 See also Goldin and Margo (1992), Goldin (1998), and Goldin and Katz (1999). 
2 Naidu (2010) estimates the effect of the 19th century disenfranchisement laws for blacks in the South and finds that 
they are associated with  a fall in black educational inputs and thus with low-quality Southern schooling.  5 
capita income. We find that, contrary to what previously established in the above cited literature,  
there is no robust evidence that those US counties that employed slave labor more heavily are 
poorer today than those that did not. Next we turn to examine how the current level of  inequality is 
shaped by slavery. We find that the distribution of per capita income is more unequal today in 
former slave counties. These results taken together indicate that the long-term influence of  slavery 
on per capita income is not on its level, but on its distribution within each county. Moreover, we 
identify the driver of income inequality in racial inequality, which is in turn determined by slavery.  
 
To test the channels through which slavery determines current income inequality, we compare three 
alternative theories: a land inequality theory, a racial discrimination theory, and a human capital 
transmission theory.  To be noticed is that, at least in principle, the three channels are not mutually 
exclusive since, as suggested by Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) and Acemoglu et al. (2008), 
institutional and economic development paths may be interlinked and jointly determined by various 
factors. For instance, the institution of public schooling, which has been a major vehicle of capital 
accumulation, as well as the removal of de facto and de jure discrimination, may have been more 
rapid and more effective in the same counties where factor endowments prevented the diffusion of 
slavery.  The empirical evidence previously reviewed on race and inequality also points to complex 
connections among all these aspects. 
 
Once again, the land inequality theory derives from the Engerman and Sokoloff hypothesis that 
links factor endowments to institutions and economic performances. If this theory is verified, the 
legal institution of slavery would affect current performances through its link with factor 
endowments. In our context, the latter could be measured by land inequality, which should in turn 
reflect the diffusion of those crops that were typical of large-scale plantations and thus of the use of 
slave labor. 
 
Our second test evaluates the potential explanatory power of  those racial discrimination theories 
which have emphasized racial differences in the value of skills. Racial discrimination can manifest 
itself on the schooling dimension, through a worse quantity and quality of the education publicly 
provided, or directly on the labor market, by denying blacks access to certain jobs (see Smith, 
1984). To measure the impact of these aspects on racial inequality and to verify its connection with 
the legacy of slavery, we construct a measure of racial discrimination by comparing the returns on 
education for blacks and whites.  
 
Our third channel of influence is represented by human capital transmission. The hypothesis we test 6 
is that the long-term influence of slavery may run through its negative impact on human capital 
accumulation. According to this hypothesis, which is closely associated with Smith (1984) and  the 
above-mentioned work on race and human capital, the counties more affected by slavery should be 
associated with worse educational attainment for the black population.  
 
For a cross section of counties, our empirical investigation supports the third theory, i. e., even after 
controlling for potential endogeneity, we find that current income inequality is primarily  influenced 
by slavery through the impact exerted by the latter on the unequal educational attainment of blacks 
and whites. If we compare our results with the Engerman and Sokoloff hypothesis, we can   
conclude that indeed the presence of an association among factor endowments, institutions and  
inequality is confirmed, but also that the final link between these variables and economic 
development is missing in our findings. In particular, the institution of slavery does not affect the 
current level of development, possibly because the potential variations in this dimension are 
absorbed by a number of national factors that attenuate it. Moreover, while factor endowments, as 
measured by  land inequality, do exert a direct effect on current inequality, their impact does not run 
through the specific institution we focus on, i.e., slavery, even though we cannot rule their potential 
impact on other relevant institutions we do not consider (e.g., political institutions). 
 
To improve our understanding of the dynamics of racial inequality along the educational dimension, 
we complete our investigation by analyzing a panel dataset covering the 1940-2000 period at the 
state level. We find that the racial educational gap significantly depends on the initial gap. Since the 
initial gap was larger in the former slave states, this confirms the influence of  slavery on racial 
educational inequality.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we revisit the evidence on the impact of 
slavery on the current level of development. In Section 3 we examine its impact on the current level 
of inequality. In Section 4 we explore three alternative channels through which this impact 
materializes. In Section 5 we review our results in Section 4 to control for endogeneity. In Section 6 
we complete our investigation by analyzing the evolution of educational attainment in the 1940-
2000 period. In Section 7 we derive our conclusions. 
 
2.  Slavery and Development: Revisiting the Evidence 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, it has been argued that slavery in the US has had a negative and 
significant effect on current per capita income. However, the channels through which slavery should 7 
affect current development have not been clarified. In more detail, Nunn (2008b) employs data at 
the county level to test the Engerman and Sokoloff  hypothesis and finds that slave use is negatively 
correlated with subsequent economic development, but that this  relationship is not driven by large-
scale plantation slavery, as suggested by the above hypothesis. He also finds a positive impact of 
slavery on inequality, for a measure of inequality given by the Gini coefficient of land holdings in 
1860, which  appears positively correlated with 2000 income inequality. However, he finds no 
impact of the 1860 land Gini on 2000 income. Lagerlöf (2005) also finds a negative relationship 
between slavery and current income at the county level, but he limits his investigation to the 
counties belonging to former slave states. Finally, on the basis of state level data, Mitchener and 
McLean (2003) argue that slavery has affected productivity as measured by income per worker. 
Given the state of art, we start by re-investigating the long-run effects of slavery and then we try to 
shed light on the mechanism at work.  
 
In Figures 1 and 2 we plot income per capita in 2000 on the share of slaves to the total population in 
1860.
3 Figure 1, which includes all counties, shows a negative and significant relationship between 
slavery and income per capita but, when in Figure 2 we confine the plot to counties within former 
slave states, the relationship becomes not significant. The plots therefore suggest that the results 
from the literature previously reviewed may not be robust, so that they may not actually capture a 
causal effect of slavery. The fact that the partial correlation turns to be insignificant (and of opposite 
sign) once confined to the sub-sample of slave states may indicate that the negative effect of slavery 
on development only captures simple structural differences between the North and the South of the 













                                                 
3 See the Data Appendix for data sources.  8 




Figure 2: Slavery and Income per Capita (Only Counties in Slave States) 
 
 
In order to investigate this hypothesis, in Table 1 we first re-estimate the same model as in Nunn 
(2008b) and then we enter geographical controls which should capture structural differences among 
different regions of the US. More specifically, we control for counties within former slave states and 
for counties within North Eastern and South Atlantic states. The last two controls are necessary 
because there is evidence that states in these regions have a higher income per capita (see Rappaport 
and Sachs, 2003 and Lagerlöf, 2005).  Model 1 replicates the basic model in Nunn (2008b), where 
population density in 1860 is also entered as a proxy for initial prosperity (as in Acemoglu et al., 
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In Model 2 we enter the slave states dummy together with our two geographical dummies and the 
effect of slavery becomes insignificant, while the coefficients of  the dummies are significant and 
with the expected sign. In Model 3 we replace the slave states dummy with a dummy for Southern 
states,
4 and the slavery variable is again not significant. In Model 4 and 5 we confine the estimates 
respectively to slave states and Southern states: in these additional models the dummy for Atlantic 
states is the only variable which retains a significant effect. To sum up, the results from Table 1 
show that the negative effect of slavery which was found in related papers captures structural 
differences among US regions and, in particular, between former slave and non-slave states, or 
between South and North. Once we control for these structural differences, there is not any 
significant direct effect of slavery on current income per capita.
5 
 
Table 1: Slavery and Economic Development 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Per Capita Income 2000 
Estimation Method: OLS  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
                 
Slaves/Population 1860  -0.239***  -0.0249 -0.0497 -0.0211  -0.0287 
 (-10.99)  (-0.79)  (-1.51)  (-0.67)  (-0.85) 
Population  Density  1860  0.0444*** 0.0386*** 0.0387*** 0.297  0.263 
  (7.26) (9.37) (9.22) (1.59)  (1.61) 
North East Dummy    0.0982***  0.120***     
   (5.61)  (6.89)     
South Atlantic Dummy    0.107***  0.111***  0.103***  0.107*** 
   (7.57)  (7.79)  (7.40)  (7.55) 
Slave States Dummy   -0.174***      
   (-13.64)      
South Dummy       -0.148***     
     (-10.53)     
Constant  10.06*** 10.09*** 10.07*** 9.911***  9.911*** 
  (1652.16) (1464.86) (1515.65) (886.96)  (753.30) 
Observations  1960 1960 1960 1026  913 
R-squared  0.08 0.21 0.18 0.08  0.08 
Sample  All Counties  All Counties  All Counties  Slave States  South States 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust t statistics in parentheses.        
 
 
After establishing that the effect of slavery on current economic performances (as of the year 2000) 
is absent, we also test whether this conclusion holds in previous decades. In Table 2, we re-estimate 
the complete model (Model 2) in Table 1 for income per capita in 1990, 1980 and 1970 and we find 
that the effect of slavery on income per capita has faded at least since 1980. There is a moderate and 
                                                 
4 The correlation between the two dummies is high but not perfect, at 0.83. 
5 For the state of  São Paulo (Brazil), Summerhill (2010) also finds that the intensity of slavery in 1872 has no 
discernable negative impact on income in 2000. 10 
significant negative impact on income per capita in 1970, even after controlling for structural 
differences.
6  The decreasing effect of slavery on income per capita is consistent with the evidence 
of a catch-up between North and South (see Caselli and Coleman, 2001). The drop in the coefficient 
on slavery after the 1970s is also consistent with a positive effect of the abolition of the Jim Craw 
Laws in 1965. This effect may have been delayed
7 
 because of adjustments in the economy which 
were mainly related to schooling. For example Margo (1990) finds a negative effect of ‘Separate 
but Equal’ schools on blacks' schooling, skills, and employment rate. It is possible therefore that this 
set of laws may have caused some distortions in the efficient allocation of factors which then had a 
negative effect on income per capita.
8 
 
Table 2: Slavery and Income from 1970 to 1990 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Per Capita Income  
Estimation Method: OLS  1970  1980  1990 
           
Slaves/Population 1860   0.134***   0.0418   0.0335 
  (-4.34) (-1.25) (-1.12) 
Population Density 1860  0.0277***  0.0237***  0.0345*** 
 (6.07)  (7.31)  (8.67) 
North East Dummy  0.0549***  0.0366***  0.112*** 
 (4.37)  (2.78)  (7.14) 
South Atlantic Dummy  0.0764***  0.0323**  0.127*** 
 (5.60)  (2.28)  (9.69) 
Slave States Dummy  -0.252***  -0.201***  -0.192*** 
 (-19.34)  (-15.85)  (-15.54) 
Constant 8.181*** 9.080*** 9.681*** 
 (1441.89)  (1541.64)  (1632.81) 
Observations 1959  1959  1960 
R-squared 0.39  0.26  0.27 
Sample  All Counties  All Counties  All Counties 




                                                 
6 We do not have data on income per capita at the county level for the 1960. However, we have data on median family 
income in 1960, which has a correlation of 0.82 with income per capita in 1970 (the serial correlation between the 
levels of income per capita in subsequent decades is between 0.89 and 0.79 and therefore almost the same as for median 
family income in 1960 and income per capita in 1970). If we use median family income as a dependent variable for 
1960 we find that the coefficient for slavery in 1960 is significant and equal to 0.23. A similar coefficient is found if we 
use as dependent variable the predicted level of income per capita in 1960 coming from the interpolation between 
median income in 1960 and income per capita in 1970.  
7 Using measures of income correlated with income per capita (see footnote above) we find that for previous decades 
the coefficient on slavery is almost constant, which suggests a positive effect of the abolishment of the Jim Crow Laws.  
8 Going further back, the historical evidence reported and interpreted by Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) suggests that 
the abolition of slavery had a small effect on the Southern economy since, after the Civil War, the landed elites 
managed to maintain economic institutions based on low-skilled, repressed labor through the exercise of de facto 
political power. 11 
3.  Slavery and Inequality:  New Evidence 
 
According to the  Engerman and Sokoloff hypothesis, the initial presence of specific factor 
endowments explains the development of agricultural production techniques based on slave labor, 
which in turn  resulted in extreme economic inequality and in a set of  political (Engerman and 
Sokoloff, 2005b), redistributive (Sokoloff and Zolt, 2007), and educational (Mariscal and Sokoloff, 
2000) institutions that reflected this inequality. The link between factor endowments and inequality 
is also empirically  documented. Galor et al. (2009) find evidence that land inequality adversely 
affected the emergence of human capital promoting institutions, as measured by educational 
expenditure across US states in the 1900-1940 period. Vollrath (2010) finds evidence of a negative 
effect of inequality on  property tax revenues in 1890. Ramcharan (2009) tests the relationship 
between land inequality and redistribution and finds a significant effect of land inequality on 
redistributive policies in the 1890-1930 period. Over a cross section of slave counties, Lagerlöf 
(2005) finds that counties which in 1850 had a larger slave population display higher racial 
inequality today. However, the link between slavery and overall economic and racial inequality 
today still remains unclear. The channel through which this link may have worked is also poorly 
understood. 
 
In Table 3 we show the distribution of inequality and poverty across the nine US Census regions.  
The three Southern regions, where the share of slaves was the largest, are the ones with highest 
levels of inequality (both in terms of racial and income inequality). The share of the population 
below the poverty level is also highest in the three Southern regions. However the table only 
provides some statistical association between variables which of course can depend on structural 
differences between regions as for the case of income per capita. For example, most of the Southern 
states (e.g., Texas, Louisiana, Kansas, etc.) are rich in natural resources (mainly oil) which may 
explain a higher degree of inequality through a resource curse.  
 
In Table 4 we test the relationship between slavery and current economic inequality once we control 
for structural differences which we proxy with appropriate dummies as in Table 1. In Model 1 we 
regress income inequality
9 on slavery, controlling for the same set of dummies introduced in Model 
2 of Table 1, i.e., the slave states dummy and two geographical dummies. As in Table 1, we also 
enter  population density as a control for initial differences in income across counties. We find that 
slavery has a positive and significant effect on income inequality, even under our controls. The 
dummy for slave states is also positive and significant suggesting that, beside slavery, there may be 
                                                 
9 See the Data Appendix for an explanation of the method used to calculate income inequality at the county level. 12 
other reasons that have worsened current economic inequality within these states. The dummy for 
the North East is also associated with higher inequality, even if the size of the coefficient is small, 
while South Atlantic states display less inequality.  In Model 2 we replace the slave states dummy 
with the South dummy, to obtain very similar results. In Model 3 we confine the estimates to slave 
states only. In all specifications, slavery always retains a positive and significant coefficient.  
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Table 4: Slavery and Economic Inequality 
 
Dependent Variable: Income Inequality 
Estimation Method: OLS  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
           
Slaves/Population 1860  0.0374***  0.0331***  0.0375*** 
 (7.42)  (6.39)  (7.46) 
Population Density 1860  0.00304***  0.00302***  0.0117 
 (4.28)  (4.36)  (0.86) 
North East Dummy  0.0108***  0.00817***   
 (6.25)  (4.78)   
South Atlantic Dummy  -0.0212***  -0.0240***  -0.0214*** 
 (-9.58)  (-10.73)  (-9.60) 
Slave States Dummy 0.0335***     
 (17.64)     
South Dummy    0.0353***   
   (17.34)   
Constant 0.387***  0.390***  0.420*** 
 (409.51)  (421.94)  (251.81) 
      
Observations 1984  1984  1050 
R-squared 0.31  0.31  0.11 
Sample   All Counties  All Counties  Slave States 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.Robust t statistics in parentheses. 
 
Region Freq. Slaves Inc. Wht Inc. Blk  Racial Ineq Income Ineq Share Blk Share Wht Poverty
New England 67 0     22873 15280 0.031 0.392  2.013 92.149 0.088
Middle Atlantic 150 0.0004 21668 13508 0.044 0.399   5.354 87.047 0.102
East North C. 437 0     19449 13383 0.027 0.386    3.109 92.396 0.097
West North C. 617 2.83 17546 12472 0.030 0.398   1.186  92.295 0.110
South Atlantic 584 36.70  20321 13078 0.084 0.417  21.06 73.381 0.143
East South C. 364 28.26  17341 11244 0.065 0.436 17.13 80.082 0.169
West South C. 469 29.10 18731 10713 0.110 0.432  10.82   68.905 0.178
Pacific 278 0.0213 19080 13577 0.068 0.405  7.13 79.929 0.139
Mountain 153 0     23317 17408 0.102 0.405 1.758  71.981 0.134
Total 3119 15.62 19219 12748 0.063 0.410   8.693  81.470 0.13513 
In Table 5 we focus on racial inequality (measured by horizontal income inequality)
10. and the effect 
of slavery is even more significant.
11 In Model 1 the dummy for slave states is significant but turns  
to be negative while the dummies for Southern and North Eastern counties are respectively   
insignificant and  marginally significant. In Model 2 we replace the slave states dummy with the 
South dummy and then in Model 3 we restrict the estimates to former slave states only. Results for 
both models are similar to those from Model 1. We therefore can conclude that there is a robust 
relationship between slavery and current income and racial inequality.  
 
Table 5: Slavery and Racial Inequality 
 
Dependent Variable: Racial Inequality 
Estimation Method: OLS  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
           
Slaves/Population 1860  0.178***  0.162***  0.179*** 
 (26.33)  (22.15)  (26.70) 
Population Density 1860  0.0102***  0.0102***  0.0532*** 
 (5.83)  (5.84)  (2.83) 
North East Dummy  0.00126  0.00475   
 (0.41)  (1.57)   
South Atlantic Dummy  -0.00537*  -0.00842***  -0.00597* 
 (-1.75)  (-2.63)  (-1.95) 
Slave States Dummy  -0.00647**     
 (-2.16)     
South Dummy    0.00590*   
   (1.71)   
Constant 0.0355***  0.0320***  0.0279*** 
 (23.39)  (23.21)  (10.84) 
      
Observations 1984  1984  1050 
R-squared 0.40  0.40  0.40 
Sample   All Counties  All Counties  Slave States 




Next in Table 6 we estimate the effect of slavery on the share of the population below the poverty 
level. As in previous tables in Model 1 we control for former slave states. In Model 2 we replace the 
slave states dummy with the South dummy. Finally in Model 3 we restrict the estimates to counties 
in former slave states only. The effect of slavery on the share of the population below poverty is 
significant and positive under all specifications. It is therefore obvious to infer that slavery affects 
the poverty rate (which is likely to be more prevalent among blacks) which in turn contributes to the 
level of  racial and income inequality within the country.  
 
                                                 
10 See Data Appendix. 
11 Consistently, in Lagerlöf (2005) slavery increases white income and decreases black income. 14 
Table 6:  Slavery and Poverty  
 
 
Dependent Variable: Population Below Poverty Level 
Estimation Method: OLS  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
           
Slaves/Population 1860  0.0575***  0.0520***  0.0575*** 
 (6.40)  (5.54)  (6.42) 
Population Density 1860  0.00377***  0.00374***  0.00768 
 (4.93)  (5.04)  (0.22) 
North East Dummy  -0.00109  -0.00534**   
 (-0.45)  (-2.19)   
South Atlantic Dummy  -0.0357***  -0.0397***  -0.0357*** 
 (-10.42)  (-11.29)  (-10.42) 
Slave States Dummy 0.0523***     
 (15.43)     
South Dummy    0.0540***   
   (14.07)   
Constant 0.0972***  0.101***  0.149*** 
 (74.68)  (77.46)  (46.65) 
      
Observations 1984  1984  1050 
R-squared 0.32  0.32  0.11 
Sample   All Counties  All Counties  Slave States 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust t statistics in parentheses. 
 
 
Finally in Table 7 we test whether slavery affects racial inequality through income disparities, or 
vice versa. In order to test these alternative hypotheses we first enter income  inequality as an 
additional regressor in the model in which we regress racial inequality on slavery (Model 1). In the 
second model (Model 2) we enter racial inequality as a regressor for economic inequality. In both 
cases, we also control for population density and for the set of dummies that appear in the first 
specifications of Tables 4-6-  In Model 1, income inequality hardly diminishes the effect of slavery 
on racial inequality. There is a positive effect of income inequality on racial inequality, but it is hard 
to establish a causality given that the two variables are for the same year.  In Model 2, once we 
control for racial inequality, slavery is no longer significant in a regression for economic inequality. 
Therefore, our results suggest that the impact of slavery on economic inequality runs through its 
impact on racial inequality. In the next two models (Models 3 and 4) we replicate the same test for 
the share of population below the poverty level. Consistently we again find that the effect of slavery 






Table 7:  The  Effect of Slavery Through Racial  Inequality  
 
 
4.  The Impact of Slavery on Current Income Inequality: Three Alternative Theories 
 
So far we have shown that the relationship between slavery and long-run development is not robust, 
but that there is a robust relationship between slavery and inequality, which appears to work through 
racial inequality. In this Section we try to understand which is the channel through which racial 
inequality, as caused by slavery, affects inequality. We test three alternative theories. The first theory 
relates to the Engerman and Sokoloff hypothesis on the link between factor endowments and 
economic inequality. The second theory focuses on racial discrimination. The human capital 
transmission is the third theory we test. 
 
According to the first theory, slavery emerged where factor endowments justified large-scale 
plantations. In other words, the impact of slavery on current inequality should come from its 
association with land inequality.
12  To test this hypothesis, we construct an index of land inequality 
                                                 
12 The direct link between endowments and slavery, where the former are measured by temperature, elevation, and 
precipitation,  has been examined for the US by Lagerlöf  (2005). 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Estimation Method: OLS Racial Inequality Income Inequality Racial Inequality Poverty 
Slaves/Population 1860 0.156*** -0.00730 0.155** -0.0149
(25.03) (-1.38) (23.94) (-1.55)
Population Density 1860 0.00842*** 0.000465 0.00872*** -0.000393
(6.25) (1.45) (5.88) (-1.00)
North East Dummy -0.00517* 0.0104*** 0.0017 -0.00160
(-1.70) (6.19) (0.54) (-0.61)
South Atlantic Dummy 0.00733*** -0.0199*** 0.00885** -0.0335***
(2.61) (-9.99) (3.18) (-10.98)
Slave States Dummy -0.0265*** 0.0352*** -0.0273*** 0.0549***
(-8.49) (19.19) (-9.03) (17.19)
Income Inequality 0.597***
(16.36)
Racial Inequality 0.251*** 0.407***
(17.28) (15.17)
Population Below Poverty Level 0.399***
(14.29)
Constant -0.196*** 0.378*** -0.00325 0.0828***
(-14.20) (378.62) (-1.18) (59.43)
Observations 1984 1984 1984 1984
R-squared 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.43
Sample All Counties All Counties All Counties All Counties
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust t statistics in parentheses.
 
      16 
similar to the one employed by Nunn (2008b).
13  It is reasonable to expect that, within counties with 
a prevalence of large-scale plantations and therefore large land inequality,  income per capita for 
whites in mid 19
th century was higher. This in turn implied, in those days, a larger degree of 
inequality between blacks and whites. This initial racial inequality may have persisted until present 
day and contributed to the higher overall economic inequality, as suggested by our results in Table 
4. Therefore, according to this first hypothesis, the effect of slavery only captures differences in the 
diffusion of large-scale plantations which used to employ a larger number of slaves, driving the 
correlation between slavery, racial inequality and economic inequality.  
 
According to the racial discrimination theory, slavery was responsible for inducing racial   
discrimination, which in turn implied a racial wage gap. To test this hypothesis we proceed as 
follows. We start by creating a measure of racial discrimination. To this end, we compute returns on 
education for blacks and whites through a model akin to a macro-Mincerian equation, which we 
estimate in the Table Appendix as Table A1. Beside educational attainment, we also control for 
experience, as proxied by the employment rate and median age for each group, for the proportion of 
whites and blacks in the labor force, to capture clusters or network effects, and for fixed 
geographical effects.
14 In Table 8 we summarize the descriptive statistics resulting from our 
estimates. As expected income per capita tends to increase with the level of education. On average, 
for educated whites income per capita is 71.3 percent higher than for whites without any formal 
education (i.e., high-school dropouts), while for educated blacks income per capita is only 36.5 
percent higher. We use predicted returns to construct a measure of  discrimination between blacks 
and whites which is equal to the ratio of average returns for blacks to returns for whites. A ratio 
below one denotes the existence of a possible racial discrimination. 
 
Table 8: Predicted Returns on Education (Blacks and Whites) 
 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
        
Estimated  Returns  Whites  3074  0.713  0.139 0.341 1.499 
Estimated Returns Blacks  2799  0.365  0.170  0.016  1.415 
                 
 
 
According to the human capital transmission theory, the legacy of slavery runs through educational 
inequality. This happens since blacks, the vast majority of whom descend from slaves with no 
education (Smith, 1989 and Margo, 1990) have accumulated a gap in terms of education which 
                                                 
13 See Data Appendix. 
14 In order to estimate returns for whites and blacks at the county level we confine the estimates to the two groups 
separately. For a discussion on macro-Mincerian equations see Krueger and Lindhal (2001) and references therein.   17 
results in economic inequality between blacks and whites, and in turn in overall inequality. To test 
this hypothesis, we construct a measure of racial inequality for education,
15 based on information on 
the attainment of blacks and whites. 
 
Table 9 presents descriptive statistics for the proxies we have constructed in order to test the three 
hypotheses presented above, i.e., for land inequality in 1860, for racial discrimination in 2000, and 
for educational inequality in 2000. We present these statistics for the entire sample of counties and 
also for the sub-sample of counties belonging to former slave states. At the mean, the ratio of the 
expected returns on education we estimated for blacks and whites is 0.51, across all counties.
16 
When confined to former slave states only, the blacks to whites ratio of returns on education is even 
smaller, suggesting the presence of more discrimination down in the South. The distribution of 
education between races
17 and the distribution of land across farms
18 are also more unequal within 
slave states. 
 




Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
          
Land Inequality in 1860  1878  0.463  0.076  0.1011  0803 
Returns Blacks/Returns Whites  2799  0.511  0.224  0.0284  2.531 
Racial Educational Inequality  3140  0.023  0.026  0.00007  0.203 
Slave States Only 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
          
Land Inequality in 1860  1037  0.480  0.076  0.119  0.803 
Returns Blacks/Returns Whites  1358  0.452  0.163  0.071  2.015 
Racial Educational Inequality  1405  0.033  0.027  0.0005  0.203 
 
 
In Table 10 we compare our three hypotheses as follows. In Model 1 we test the land inequality 
theory. We enter the index of land inequality in 1860 as a regressor for income inequality, to find 
that its coefficient is highly significant and with the expected positive sign, but that the impact of 
slavery is hardly diminished.
19 This effect suggests that land inequality does contribute to income 
inequality, but it is not the channel through which slavery manifests its impact on current 
                                                 
15  See Data Appendix. 
16 We omit as outliers those few counties (67) for which the ratio is zero. In these counties the number of blacks is small 
(26 on average) and all of them dropped out of school before gaining a diploma.  
17 Racial educational inequality is zero in those counties (only three counties) where only a single race is present. We 
also omit these counties as outliers.  
18 The index of land inequality is zero for six counties in which farm size falls within the same range. 
19 Acemoglu et al. (2008) document a negative cross-state relationship between land inequality in 1860 and school 
enrollment both in 1870 and 1950. 18 
inequality.
20 In Model 2 we enter the returns ratio to the same basic specification to test the racial 
discrimination theory. As expected the ratio displays a significant and negative coefficient, but again 
does not affect the coefficient of slavery, which implies a contribution of racial discrimination to 
inequality but does not identifies in this factor the influence of slavery on the dependent variable. 
Finally, in Model 3, to test the human capital transmission theory, we enter the control for racial 
educational inequality and we find not only that this measure is significant, but also that if fully 
explains the impact of slavery, which loses significance. Table 11 replicates the same set of 
regressions of Table 10 by entering the poverty rate as dependent variable. Once again we find that 
slavery loses its significance only when we control for racial educational inequality. 
 
Table 10: Slavery and Inequality: Comparison Among Theories  
Dependent Variable: Income Inequality 
Estimation Method: OLS  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
     
Slaves/Population  1860  0.0381*** 0.0366*** 0.000556 
  (7.33) (7.34) (0.10) 
Population Density 1860  0.00284***  0.00295  0.000808** 
  (4.51) (0.39) (2.15) 
North  East  Dummy  0.0108*** 0.0104*** 0.0102*** 
  (6.16) (5.29) (6.00) 
South  Atlantic  Dummy  -0.0194*** -0.0214*** -0.0231*** 
  (-8.71) (-9.24) (-11.37) 
Slave  States  Dummy  0.0310*** 0.0325*** 0.0349*** 
  (15.25) (16.43) (19.27) 
Land Inequality 1860  0.0456***     
 (4.64)     
Returns Blacks/Returns Whites    -0.0117***   
   (-3.48)   
Racial Educational Inequality    0.569*** 
    (17.16) 
Constant  0.366*** 0.393*** 0.380*** 
 (84.18)  (185.71)  (400.24) 
Observations  1878 1895 1984 
R-squared  0.32 0.31 0.41 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust t statistics in parentheses except for Model 2 in which we bootstrap standard 









                                                 
20 In Table A2 of the Table Appendix we perform a couple of robustness checks to gauge the impact of land distribution. 
In Model 1, as an alternative measure of land inequality other than the Gini index, we enter the mean log deviation 
(namely, a General Entropy Index with α = 0, also known as a GE(0)). In Model 2, to control for measurement errors, 
we instrument the land Gini with latitude. In both cases our previous conclusions hold.  19 
Table 11: Slavery and Poverty: Comparison Among Theories 
 
Dependent Variable: Population Below Poverty Rate 
Estimation Method: OLS  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
     
Slaves/Population  1860  0.0594*** 0.0576*** -0.00635 
  (6.58) (6.18) (-0.63) 
Population Density 1860  0.00347***  0.00364  0.0001 
  (5.26) (0.45) (-0.24) 
North  East  Dummy  -0.000508 -0.000981 -0.00212 
  (-0.21) (-0.37) (-0.85) 
South  Atlantic  Dummy  -0.0320*** -0.0354*** -0.0389*** 
 (-9.17)  (-10.47)  (-12.31) 
Slave  States  Dummy  0.0476*** 0.0503*** 0.0545*** 
  (13.95) (14.85) (18.10) 
Land Inequality 1860  0.0744***     
 (4.11)     
Returns Blacks/Returns Whites    -0.0179***   
   (-3.94)   
Racial  Educational  Inequality    0.985*** 
    (15.40) 
Constant 0.0633***  0.106***  0.0858*** 
 (8.01)  (37.21)  (66.29) 
Observations  1878 1926 1984 
R-squared  0.34 0.33 0.44 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust t statistics in parentheses except for Model 2 in which we bootstrap standard 
errors because of the predicted  variable. 
 
 
To conclude, our results show that even though land inequality and racial discrimination matter for 
current inequality, it is through human capital transmission that slavery determines the cross-




5.  Controlling for the Endogeneity of Racial Educational Inequality  
 
It is reasonable to conclude that current income inequality is primarily influenced by slavery 
through the impact exerted by the latter on the unequal educational attainment between races. 
However, a possible objection to this conclusion is of course the potential endogeneity of racial 
educational inequality, even though data for educational attainment are stock data for the population 
of 25 years of age and above, which means that decisions about schooling are taken well before 
2000. This implies that our regressions should not present problems of causality. Still,  they can  
present a problem related to a possible correlation between educational attainment and the error 
term (due to unobserved heterogeneity, measurement errors, etc.), which can affect the magnitude of 
                                                 
21 Bobonis and Morrow (2010) examine the consequences of labor market coercion for individuals’ decisions to 
accumulate human capital in the context of nineteenth century Puerto Rico.  
 20 
the coefficient if the relationship is estimated using an OLS estimator. However, if we can assume 
that effect of slavery is only through educational inequality, we can use the former as an excluded 
instrument for the latter in a two stage least estimation  (2SLS) which should provide consistent 
estimates. 
 
We can write the 2SLS system as:  
 
Yi = αi + β1Ei + β2Xi + εi                                                                                                     (1) 
 Ei = λi + γ1 Si +  γ2 Xi + ηi                                                                                                    (2) 
 
where Yi  represents economic inequality,  Ei  represents racial educational inequality, Si  is the share 
of slaves in 1860 and Xi  denotes other exogenous controls. In (1) income inequality depends on 
educational inequality and other exogenous factors. In (2) racial educational inequality depends on 
slavery which, according to Table 7, should not have any direct effect on inequality and other 
exogenous factors. Therefore, slavery does satisfy the necessary requirement for an excluded 
instrument.  
 
Table 12 presents results for the 2SLS estimation in a regression where land inequality and the 
returns ratio are entered together with the instrumented racial inequality.  As expected, in the first 
stage regression (Panel B) slavery explains a large proportion of the racial educational inequality. 
The endogeneity test does not reject the hypothesis that racial educational inequality is orthogonal 
to income inequality and the weak identification test (i.e., a comparison between the Cragg-Donald 
statistics and the Stock and Yogo critical values) confirms that the instrument we employ is 
appropriately correlated with the instrumented variable. The coefficient for racial educational 
inequality in the second stage regression (Panel A, Model 1) is significant at 1 percent and its 
magnitude is even larger than the one obtained using an OLS estimator. In general a 1 percent 
increase of racial  educational inequality increases economic inequality by 0.59 percent. Land 
inequality has still a significant effect on income inequality, while the returns ratio is not significant.  
Model replicates the second stage regression with the poverty rate as dependent variable and similar 
results hold.   
 
To sum up, we can conclude that our hypothesis, according to which the effect of slavery runs 
through human capital transmission, is confirmed even after controlling for endogeneity. 21 
Table 12: 2SLS Estimates 
 
Second Stage Regressions 
   Model 1  Model 2 
Estimation Method: 2SLS   Income Inequality   Poverty   
    
Racial Educational Inequality  0.590***  0.957*** 
 (7.42)  (6.94) 
Population Density 1860  0.000608  -0.000132 
 (1.47)  (-0.23) 
North East Dummy  0.0101***  -0.00141 
 (5.75)  (-0.55) 
South Atlantic Dummy  -0.0220***  -0.0356*** 
 (-10.10)  (-10.18) 
Slave States Dummy  0.0331***  0.0501*** 
 (18.70)  (18.54) 
Land Inequality 1860  0.0299***  0.0475*** 
 (3.41)  (3.13) 
Returns Blacks/Returns Whites  0.00146  0.00386 
 (0.42)  (0.69) 
Constant 0.366***  0.0622*** 
 (94.49)  (9.80) 
    
Cragg Donald Statistics  532.982  532.982 
Stok and Yogo Critical Values  (16.23)  (16.38) 
Endogeneity (p-values)  0.8101  0.6856 
Hansen J-Statistics (p-values)  0.0000  0.0000 
Anderson LR Statistic   469.604  469.604 
Instruments  Slaves/Population 1860  Slaves/Population 1860 
 
First Stage Regressions 
Dependent Variable  Racial Educational Inequality  
    
Slaves/Population 1860  0.0627***   
 (19.54)   
Population Density 1860  0.00363***   
 (6.34)   
North East Dummy  0.0011   
 (0.95)   
South Atlantic Dummy  0.00428***   
 (3.35)   
Slave States Dummy -0.00469***   
 (-3.03)   
Land Inequality 1860  0.0289***   
 (3.04)   
Returns Blacks/Returns Whites  -0.0216***   
 (-10.23)   
Constant 0.00973**   
   (2.21)   
Observations 1831   
R-squared 0.43   




6.      Convergence and Divergence in Educational Attainment 
 
To improve our understanding of the dynamics of racial inequality along the educational dimension, 
we complete our investigation by analyzing a panel dataset of educational attainment across races 
for the US states for the 1940-2000 period. Smith (1984), Smith and Welch (1989), Margo (1990) 
and Collins and Margo (2006) provide a description and an interpretation of the underlying 
evolution of these variables. Here we build on this literature.  
 
Even though information on educational attainment data is only available after 1940, the data show 
a very high correlation between the racial gap in education in 1940 and the fraction 
slaves/population in 1860. At the high-school level the correlation is 0.90, while it is 0.78 at the 
bachelor-degree level. Therefore, we can treat the initial gap as of 1940 as a proxy for the effect of 
slavery.  
 
Table 13 shows the shares of whites and blacks with at least either a high-school education or a 
bachelor degree. Over the 1940-2000 period whites are on average more educated than blacks. The 
share of the white population with at least a high-school level of education is above 60% against a 
47% of the black population. The gap between whites and blacks is even larger (in relative terms) 
when we consider the share of  the population with a bachelor degree (15.4% against 8.8%). In this 
case the share of the black population holding a bachelor degree is in mean 40% smaller than the 
one for the white. In addition, the population in the North of the US seems to have a higher level of 
education both within the black and the white population.  
 
Figure 3 shows the educational gap between whites and blacks calculated as the ratio of the share of 
whites to the share of blacks with at least a high-school diploma (on the LHS) or a bachelor degree 
(on the RHS). The figure shows a sort of convergence in the share of the population (belonging to 
the two groups) with a high-school education. The gap between the shares of whites and blacks 
holding a bachelor degree also decreases over time, but this seems to occurs at a slower rate. The 
two figures at the bottom show that those states which have started with a larger gap are nowadays 
the ones which still have larger racial inequality in terms of education. 
 
In Table 14 we regress the educational gap on the shares of educated whites and blacks in 1940, in a 
parsimonious specification where we only control for population and time and regional fixed 
effects, in order to use the maximal number of observations. Model 1 shows that the gap in high-
school education depends significantly on the initial gap. At the mean, the educational gap at the 
high-school level of education is 0.30 percent higher for a 1 percent increase in the initial gap. 23 
Model 2 shows results for the gap between shares of the population holding a bachelor degree. 
Decreasing the initial gap for the population holding a bachelor degree by a 1 percent decreases the 
gap by almost 0.28 percent. In Models 3 and 4 the fraction of slaves in the population in 1860 has a 
significantly positive effect on the racial gaps both at the high-school and bachelor levels. However, 
when in Models 4 and 5 we enter this variable together with the initial gaps, it loses significance, as 
expected given the pattern of correlation previously mentioned.
22 This once again confirms that the 
impact of slavery on the evolution of the educational gap runs through its impact on the initial gaps. 
To sum up, the results  in Table 14 confirm the trend reported in Figure 3, according to which states 
which have initiated with a larger racial gap in terms of education still have nowadays a larger racial 
educational inequality, if compared to states in which blacks and whites had similar levels of 
education. 
 




Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
          
High-School Diploma (Whites)  297  60.2291  21.34998  16.37847  94.43 
Bachelor Degree (Whites)  297  15.42412  9.624878  2.813198  77.3 
High-School Diploma (Blacks)  297  47.18088  26.79546  2.594816  95.9 
Bachelor Degree (Blacks)  297  8.758676  6.594131  .3484704  34.82 
          
North of the US Only 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
          
High-School Diploma (Whites)  199  64.82332  20.23654  20.85144  94.43 
Bachelor Degree (Whites)  199  16.91558  10.25016  3.544309  77.3 
High-School Diploma (Blacks)  199  54.32846  25.12736  5.924223  95.9 
Bachelor Degree (Blacks)  199  10.1778  7.026015  1.125535  34.82 
          
South of the US Only 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
          
High-School Diploma (Whites)  98  50.90004  20.58661  16.37847  86.31 
Bachelor Degree (Whites)  98  12.39555  7.375334  2.813198  34.73 
High-School Diploma (Blacks)  98  32.66692  24.17767  2.594816  78.95 






                                                 
22 In Models 3-6 the number of observations is lower since a few states (e.g., Hawaii, Idaho, Montana) do not appear in 
the 1860 Census.  24 
Figure 3: The Educational Gap between Whites and Blacks (1940 – 2000) 
 
 
Table 14: The Determinants  of the Racial Educational Gap 
 
Estimation Method: Pooled OLS  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
   Gap H.S.  Gap Bach.  Gap H.S.  Gap Bach.  Gap H.S.  Gap Bach. 
           
Educational Gap in 1940 (High-S.)  0.300***        0.238***  
 (5.37)        (2.98)  
Educational Gap in 1940 (Bachelor)    0.279***       0.279*** 
   (3.60)       (2.65) 
Slaves/Population 1860      4.404***  4.105***  1.197 -0.466 
     (5.36)  (3.56)  (1.54) (-0.49) 
Population -0.136***  -0.0729  -0.147***  -0.0716  -0.133*** -0.0765 
 (-4.05)  (-1.38)  (-3.86)  (-1.07)  (-3.77) (-1.29) 
Slave States Dummy  -0.0641  -0.280  -0.427**  -0.592**  -0.198 -0.0744 
 (-0.51)  (-1.61)  (-2.08)  (-2.01)  (-1.35) (-0.50) 
Constant 4.545***  4.154***  5.287***  4.832***  4.636*** 4.255*** 
 (8.02)  (4.95)  (7.89)  (4.28)  (7.81) (4.65) 
Time Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    
Observations 297  297  258  258  258 258 
R-squared 0.68  0.53  0.65  0.43  0.68 0.53 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust t statistics in parentheses. 
 
 
In Table 15 we add some additional controls to Models 1 and 2 of Table 14. The use of additional 
controls reduces the sample size, but it permits to evaluate additional factors which may have 
affected the dynamics. In the first two models we control for the share of blacks, whose dynamics 
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should capture the massive migration flows occurring across states during this period, and for the 
ratio of numbers of farms and manufacturing establishments to the total population, to proxy for 
structural changes in the economy.
23 The share of blacks marginally explains (being significant at 
10 percent) the gap in high-school education, but it is significant in explaining differences between 
blacks and whites holding a bachelor degree, denoting that much of the difference in education in 
former slave states (the ones with the larger number of blacks) remains at the higher-education 
level. The two variables that we use to proxy for structural changes (i.e., the proportion of farms 
and manufacturing establishments) are only significant in Model 1. Increasing the proportion of 
farms increases the gap in the high-school level of education by 1 percent, while the elasticity 
associated with the proportion of manufacturing establishments tends to decrease the gap by almost 
2 percent. The latter effect may occur because returns to education in the manufacturing sector are 
higher and therefore individuals are more willing to acquire education in the presence of many 
manufacturing establishments. Instead in rural areas (with a higher number of farms) returns to 
educations are likely to be lower, which associated with land inequality explains the higher 
educational gap. The non significance of the same two regressors for the bachelor level, in Model 2, 
can be explained by the fact that the latter is less correlated with these two sectors.  
 
Finally in Models 3 and 4 we control for median family income and for the ratio of general direct 
expenditure on education to general direct expenditure.
24 Richer states tend to have a smaller gap at 
the high-school level of education (Model 3), however this is reversed for the bachelor level, 
presumably because once gained a high-school diploma whites are more likely to go for further 
education when income per capita increases (Model 4). The education share of the general direct 
expenditure is only significant in the model for higher education (Model 4). Increasing expenditures 
on education by a 1 percent decreases the gap by almost 0.95 percent. The educational gap is 
significant in all specifications except Model 4.  
 
To conclude, our results confirm that, over the period under consideration, after controlling for a 
large variety of factors, the present level of the racial educational gap is largely explained by the 





                                                 
23 The data are collected from the City and County Data-Book and normally refer to three years before the Census 
(1937, 1947, etc.). 
24 These data are also collected from the City and County Data-Book. 26 
Table 15: The Determinants of the Racial Educational Gap: Extended Models 
Estimation Method: Pooled OLS  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
   Gap High-Schl.  Gap Bach. Dgr.  Gap High-Schl.  Gap Bach. Dgr.
        
Educational Gap in 1940 (High-School)  0.221***    0.143***   
  (2.68)    (4.49)   
Educational Gap in 1940 (Bachelor Degree)    0.180**    0.0356 
   (2.00)    (1.51) 
Population -0.0947**  -0.00761  -0.00604  0.00821 
  (-2.52) (-0.15)  (-0.30) (0.24) 
Slave States Dummy  -0.253  -0.597**  -0.173*  -0.104 
  (-1.57) (-2.56)  (-1.90) (-1.11) 
Black Population Share  0.0336*  0.0481***  0.00705**  0.0376*** 
  (1.85) (4.39)  (2.48) (10.27) 
Number of Farms  0.0104***  0.00514    
  (2.84) (0.82)   
Number of Manufacturing Establish.  -0.0209***  0.000575    
  (-2.61) (0.04)    
Median Family Income     -0.640** 1.153*** 
     (-2.41) (4.47) 
Educational Expenditure/Direct General Exp.    -0.00178 -0.00946** 
     (-0.53) (-2.19) 
Constant 3.280***  2.753***  7.334***  -7.726*** 
  (5.04) (3.09)  (2.98) (-3.48) 
Time Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 238  238  183  183 
R-squared 0.76  0.62  0.76  0.68 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust t statistics in parentheses. 
 
 
7.  Conclusion  
 
In this paper we have shown that the institution of slavery still plays a major role in the US 
economy and society. The main legacy of slavery is not on the level of development, but on the 
degree of inequality. In other words, those US counties that in the past have been more heavily 
affected by slave labor turn out to be not poorer, but more unequal, in the present day. We also show 
that the current level of income inequality is explained by racial inequality, which is in turn 
determined by slavery through its impact on the racial gap in human capital accumulation.  While 
other factors that have been linked to slavery, such as initial endowments and racial discrimination, 
are also shown to affect current inequality, our results suggest that human capital transmission is the 
main channel through which slavery manifests its legacy.  
 
In March 2010 President Obama presented Congress with a plan to reform No Child Left Behind 
(NCLB), America’s main federal education programme, enacted in 2002 under President Bush with 
the full bipartisan support of Congress. Given the apparent failure of the education policies 27 
introduced under NCLB, it is likely that the next few months will witness a heated debate about the 
state of America’s education system and its weaknesses, among which profound racial and ethnic 
educational gaps play a prominent role  (Hursh, 2007). Our work shows, on the one hand, that 
educational inequality is a central driver of income inequality and, on the other, how deeply rooted 
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Table Appendix  
 
Table A1: Returns on Education (Blacks and Whites) 
   Model 1  Model 2 
Dependent Variable:  Income (2000) Whites Only  Income (2000) Blacks Only 
Estimation Method: OLS       
        
High-School Diploma  0.683***  0.260*** 
 (4.84)  (2.82) 
Some Years of College (no Bachelor)  0.596***  0.532*** 
 (2.95)  (3.63) 
Bachelor Degree  1.646***  0.789*** 
 (11.47)  (6.24) 
Post-Graduate Education (Master or PhD)  1.890***  1.409*** 
 (8.54)  (7.54) 
Employment Rate  1.601***  0.368*** 
 (5.62)  (2.68) 
Whites in Labour Force  0.0330***  0.0778*** 
 (6.31)  (6.78) 
Blacks in Labour Force  0.0134***  0.0110 
 (4.42)  (1.49) 
Median Age  0.0109***  0.0267*** 
 (6.13)  (11.03) 
North East Dummy  -0.0165  0.0235 
 (-0.52)  (0.47) 
South Atlantic Dummy  0.0410  0.0276 
 (1.55)  (0.59) 
South Central Dummy  0.0388  -0.0720** 
 (1.36)  (-2.62) 
Constant 6.680***  7.000*** 
 (24.26)  (51.20) 
Sample   All Counties  All Counties 
Observations 3030  2714 
R-squared 0.77  0.27 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.       













Table A2: Robustness Checks for Land Inequality 
Dependent Variable: Income Inequality 
  Model 1  Model 2 
Estimation Method:   OLS  IV 
    
Slaves/Population 1860  0.0339***  0.0407*** 
 (6.32)  (5.86) 
Population Density 1860  0.00286***  0.00154*** 
 (4.57)  (5.50) 
North East Dummy  0.0107***  0.00708*** 
 (6.12)  (3.19) 
South Atlantic Dummy  -0.0198***  -0.0103*** 
 (-8.83)  (-3.56) 
Slave States Dummy  0.0319***  0.0138*** 
 (16.20)  (4.35) 
Land Inequality 1860 (Gini Index)    0.335*** 
   (7.03) 
Land Inequality 1860 (GE(0))  0.0222***   
 (4.04)   
    
Constant 0.377***  0.241*** 
 (158.59)  (11.46) 
Cragg Donald F-statistic    169.839 
Stock and Yogo Critical Values (10% maximal Size)    19.93 
Hansen J-Statistic (p-values)    0.0000 
Anderson LR-Statistic    163.174 
Observations 1878  1878 
R-squared 0.31  0.09 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust t statistics in parentheses. 





Data Appendix  
 
The following datasets have been used: 
 
a) The Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data: The United States, 1790-2000, 
downloaded from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Studies 
(http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/), is used for the following variables: Total slaves number in 1860, 
Total population in 1860, and Size of farms in 1860. 
 
b) The United States Decennial Census 2000, downloaded through the American Fact Finder 
(http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html?_lang=en), is used for the 2000 levels of:     
Households income, Median family income, Shares of population for each race, Total Population, 
Median age, Employment rate, and Civilian labor force participation.  33 
 
c) As in Nunn (2008b) data on income per capita are downloaded from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, Table CA1-3, located at www.bea.gov/regional/reis/. 
 
d) The US Census Bureau, Selected Historical Decennial Census Population and Housing Counts 
(www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/hiscendata.html) is used for data on Education, 
Population, and Share of blacks at the state level for the 1940-2000 period.  
 
e) The US City and County Data-Book, which is included in the  Historical, Demographic, 
Economic, and Social Data, is used for data on Number of farms, Number of manufacturing 
establishments, General direct expenditure, and Ratio of education expenditure to general direct 
expenditure at the state level for the period 1940-2000.  
 
f) Geographical Dummy Variables are constructed using the US Census regional classification. 
 
g) Inequality measures have been computed as follows, using the STATA package 
EGEN_INEQUAL provided by Lokshin and Sajaia (2006):  
 
1)  Land Inequality – The Gini index of land inequality is calculated using information about 
the size of each farm from the 1860 Census. Sizes of farms fall in the following ranges:  (1) 
9 acres or less, (2) 10 to 19 acres, (3) 20 to 49 acres, (4) 50 to 99 acres, (5) 100 to 499 acres, 
(6) 500 to 999 acres, and (7) 1,000 acres or more. Since for each category we do not know 
the mean farm size, we assume that farms are uniformly distributed within each category 
and then we take the mean size for the category. As in Nunn (2008b) and Lagerlöf (2005), 
for the category 1,000 acres or more we use 1,000 acres. 
 
2)  Income Inequality – The Gini index of income inequality is calculated using data from the 
2000 CENSUS (downloaded through the US Fact Finder). We adopt the CENSUS 
categories and we assume that households within each category are uniformly distributed, so 
that in order to find the Gini index we take the mean value. For the category $200,000 or 
more we take $200,000.  
 
3)  Racial Income Inequality -  This is the Gini index for income per capita in 2000 (CENSUS 
2000) for each race in the Census. Using information on classes of income for each race we  
obtain a horizontal Gini index to calculate the distribution of income across races. 34 
 
4) Racial Educational Inequality – Data on educational attainment are downloaded from the 
National Center for Education Statistics. For each race we have data on the share of the 
population with: 1) no high-school diploma (0-9 grade but no diploma); 2) with a high-
school diploma; 3) with some years of college (but no degree); 4) with an undergraduate 
degree; 5) with a master’s degree; 5) with a PhD. We code this information as follows: 1, if 
the individual did not gain a high-school diploma; 2,  if  he has a high-school diploma; 3, if 
he has some years of colleges; 4,  if  he has an undergraduate degree; and so on. We use this 
coding rule to calculate the Gini index across races.  “Materiali di Discussione” LATER PUBLISHED ELSEWHERE 
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